

**GREEN ASH**
PARTNERS

GA-Courtenay Special Situations Fund

*the hedge fund journal***UCITS Hedge
Awards 2025****Event Driven****Best Performing Fund over 5 Years**
GA-Courtenay Special Situations**Shortlisted: Emerging Performance of the
Year, UCITS - Alternative Equity Strategies**
GA - Courtenay Special Situations Fund

The GA-Courtenay Special Situations Fund “SSF” is an award winning performance orientated hedge fund targeting consistent positive returns across diverse market conditions.

The fund maintains a portfolio of structurally advantaged equity special situation investments, enhanced by a positive carry hedge structure combining merger arbitrage yield with index put option protection.

Winner (2025) of Best Performing Event Driven UCITS Fund (5 years) from the Hedge Fund Journal.

The fund is managed within Green Ash Partners LLP, 11 Albemarle Street, London, W1S 4HH, UK. Green Ash Partners is regulated by the FCA.

SSF performance net of fees to June 18th, 2025

Since inception the GA-Courtenay Special Situations (USD I class) has returned 13.3% net annualised at low correlation to the market at large

GA-COURTENAY SPECIAL SITUATIONS FUND (USD I) PERIOD NET RETURNS

| | | | |
|--------------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------------------|
| Price at 18-Jun-25 | Month to 18-Jun-25 | Year to 18-Jun-25 | Annualised since inception (%) |
| \$203.00 | 1.3% | 7.4% | 13.3% |

| | Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | YTD |
|------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| 2025 | 0.5 | -1.6 | -0.2 | 0.9 | 6.5 | 1.3 | | | | | | | 7.4 |
| 2024 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 0.7 | -2.6 | 1.6 | 2.2 | 0.6 | -0.7 | 0.1 | 0.6 | -0.6 | 0.2 | 5.0 |
| 2023 | 7.6 | -3.2 | -5.4 | 0.6 | -6.6 | -4.1 | 1.0 | -2.5 | -2.4 | -2.0 | 23.2 | 3.0 | 6.4 |
| 2022 | -1.2 | 2.0 | 2.3 | -3.1 | -6.7 | -6.1 | 1.5 | 7.7 | 1.0 | -9.0 | -0.2 | -0.5 | -12.8 |
| 2021 | 7.7 | 4.2 | -3.2 | -0.3 | 0.5 | -4.7 | -1.9 | 2.5 | 3.0 | 17.6 | -2.1 | 1.6 | 24.4 |
| 2020 | 8.4 | -2.5 | -13.2 | 6.1 | 8.7 | 20.5 | 5.6 | -5.1 | 5.7 | -4.0 | -2.7 | 13.2 | 42.8 |
| 2019 | | | | | | | | | | 0.6 | 4.0 | 4.4 | 9.1 |


Note: Inception 17-Oct-2019; Performance figures are for share class USD I = the fund's base currency.

Leading performance relative to peer UCITS hedge funds

Period October 2019 to May 2025

Hedge Fund Journal Recognition: SSF is strongest performing event driven UCITS hedge fund since inception (Oct 2019)

Relative to *all* UCITS hedge funds, SSF ranks #3 of 502 since inception; table shows top 20



the hedge fund journal

UCITS Hedge Awards 2025

Event Driven

Best Performing Fund over 5 Years

GA-Courtenay Special Situations

GA Courtenay Special Situations UCITS

Buffett-esque hunting for mergers and special situations

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Originally published on 22 Nov 2020

Green Ash Partners' GA-Courtenay Special Situations has received *The Hedge Fund Journal's* 2025 UCITS Hedge award for best returns over 5 years ending in December 2024, in the Event Driven strategy category. During this 5-year period, which took in the Covid-19 pandemic, the 2022 bear market, and heavy redemptions in 2023 (when the fund was managed from Odey Asset Management), the fund averaged mid-seven returns. Manager Adrian Courtenay featured in *The Hedge Fund Journal's* 2023, Tomson's 5 Years report on rising star hedge fund managers.

Courtenay's presentations at Sohn Conference Foundation events in Monaco and London highlighted long-term equity investing special situations such as low-cost UK computer maker, Raspberry Pi. That said, the fund has engaged on merger arbitrage – typically 100-120% gross exposure – employing proprietary analytics and occasional activism. Both strategies are partly inspired by Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger's partnership, which dates to the 1960s.

“We need to make a case by case judgment including the human element, such as whether we trust CEOs and other deal protagonists.”

Adrian Courtenay, Manager, GA-Courtenay Special Situations

Courtenay, who has spent over 20 years researching and investing in merger, event driven and equity strategies, prizes the predictability and timeliness of selected merger deals, which can offer consistent and decoupled returns regardless of market direction. Other events such as Dutch auctions can be traded, but do not always provide comparable predictability.

Courtenay invests in around 10% of global mergers, usually with shorter timeframes than the 6 to 6 month average across all announced deals. Merger arbitrage can target returns as high as 1-2% per month, including a few rare loss crystallizations, though when safe, robust deals offer less, Courtenay moderates the return target rather than increasing risk.

Put protection

Unlike some merger arbitrageurs, Courtenay holds index put protection that helped to preserve capital in the first quarter of 2022. “You must protect capital to grow and compound it. The puts are designed to protect against a deep equity market pullback such as a Covid-19 March 2020 scenario. It is well-accepted merger arbitrage is conceptually selling a put, so normally this pays about 6 times more than the cost of our equivalent buy of an index put,” he explains. Courtenay can weather shocks widening spreads partly due to the puts, but also because leverage does not exceed 50-60%.

Courtenay is not market, beta, sector and factor neutral, but avoids large wagers on less predictable elements.

Lessons from 20 years

Forbes founder Tim Babich, who featured in the first edition (2000) of *The Hedge Fund Journal's* Tomson's 5 Years report, taught Courtenay to focus on legal rights under restructurings in distressed debt. “In 2009 when Max Mosley threatened Formula One with a bankruptcy, I swiftly bought paper at 30 cents on the dollar, which later returned to par after Mosley reached a rapprochement with Formula One,” recalls Courtenay. Sixteen years later his focus has shifted to the US-listed equity of Formula One, which has a compelling catalyst in 2025 related to broadcast rights renegotiations.

| | Annualised return Oct 2019 to end May 2025 |
|--|--|
| 1 Schroder GAIA Contour Tech Equity | 14.2% |
| 2 Seahawk Equity Long Short Fund | 13.9% |
| 3 GA-Courtenay Special Situations Fund | 13.2% |
| 4 Argonaut Absolute Return | 13.1% |
| 5 BlackRock Asia Pacific Diversified Equity Absolute Return | 13.0% |
| 6 AQR Sustainable Delphi Long-Short Equity UCITS Fund | 12.4% |
| 7 Liontrust GF European Strategic Equity | 12.3% |
| 8 WS Lancaster Absolute Return | 12.1% |
| 9 MontLake Cooper Creek Partners North America Long Short Equity | 12.0% |
| 10 Dalton Asia Pacific UCITS | 10.7% |
| 11 Alger SICAV - Alger Dynamic Opportunities Fund | 10.5% |
| 12 JPM Europe Equity Absolute Alpha | 9.6% |
| 13 TM Tellworth UK Select | 9.6% |
| 14 Schroder GAIA Egerton Equity | 9.5% |
| 15 GAM Star Global Rates | 9.3% |
| 16 Ardtur European Focus Absolute Return | 9.0% |
| 17 InRIS Parus | 8.9% |
| 18 Carmignac Portfolio Long Short European Equities | 8.6% |
| 19 Jupiter Merian Global Equity Absolute Return Fund | 8.5% |
| 20 Fiera OAKS Emerging and Frontier Opportunities | 8.0% |


Source: Absolute Hedge

Full article PDF on GA-Courtenay website

Attractive risk and de-correlation metrics


Period October 2019 to May 2025

Returns relative to risk: on a Sortino Ratio basis (return/down months SD), SSF ranks in the top one third (26th percentile) of all UCITS funds



Source: GA-Courtenay research, Absolute Hedge UCITS funds database

De-correlation from other funds: SSF's leading performance is also concurrent with below average correlation to other UCITS funds and as such SSF also acts as a powerful portfolio *de-correlator*



Source: GA-Courtenay research, Absolute Hedge UCITS funds database

Fund information

| | |
|---------------------------------------|---|
| Inception date: | October 17 th , 2019 |
| AUM: | \$32m |
| Annualised return since inception: | 13.3% |
| Manager focus: | GA-Courtenay Special Situations Fund is the only investment entity overseen by the fund manager and the fund manager is fully invested in the product |
| Structure: | UCITS (Irish domiciled) |
| Base currency and share classes: | Base currency: USD, other share classes: EUR, GBP and CHF |
| Administrator, auditor and custodian: | Administrator: US Bank, Auditor: Deloitte, Custodian: European Deposit Bank |
| Dealing: | Daily, 2pm |
| Strategy: | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A portfolio of structurally advantaged equity special situation investments, enhanced by a positive carry hedge structure combining merger arbitrage yield with index put option protection • Extensive, internally developed, code-based proprietary systems that optimise both research throughput and execution agility • Intensive per situation due diligence through deep dive research • Historic success targeting highly accretive situations within both equity investments and merger arbitrage including competitive bidding situations, contingent value rights, and shareholder activism • Index put options held for market dislocation scenarios, beta neutralisation |
| Leverage tolerance: | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Variable with opportunity set |
| Fee structure: | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annual management charge 75bps (institutional share classes) • Performance fee 20% with underperformance carried forward |

Fund manager bio

Fund manager bio

- 2023 – present: Green Ash Partners, GA-Courtenay Special Situations Fund
- 2016 – 2023: Odey Asset Management (Special Situations Fund launches 2019)
- 2014 – 2016: D.E. Shaw & Co, Vice President, Special Situations Group
- 2000 – 2012: Tisbury Capital, Fortelus Capital (both special situations hedge funds)
- 1998 – 2000: Oxford University (Scholar, 1st class MA, Oriel College)



Key strengths

- Wide-ranging experience in situation assessment and relationship building across global developed markets
- Extensive search and history systems to accelerate situation discovery, analysis and risk management
- Extensive due diligence competency through deep dive research
- Demonstrated ability to accrete situation economics by activist engagement

“Turn every page” – a comprehensive search for opportunities throughout the global merger arbitrage and global equity special situation domains

“We showed a movie about Berkshire Hathaway last year that was called Turn Every Page. And I would say that turning every page is an important ingredient to bring to the investment field. Some of them you want to turn pretty fast, but [if you turn every page] you just get lucky in life, and you want to take advantage of your luck.

And very few people do turn every page. And the ones who turn every page aren't going to tell you what they're finding. So you got to do a little bit yourself.”

Warren Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting May 2025

Equity special situations

Search breadth: global developed markets

Market capitalisation range: \$500m+

Nature of opportunities: holding period three years or more; situations possess beta, moderated by combining with put option protection

Style: high quality companies at mid-stage of growth, following announcement or high probability of announcement with the potential to accelerate economics

Merger arbitrage

Search breadth: global developed markets

Market capitalisation range: \$100m+

Nature of opportunities: duration 3-6 months, return characteristics independent of broader market conditions

Style: focus on binding, high forecast accuracy. The competitive bidding situation is the blue sky opportunity

“Come up with a different set of problems to attack” – our approach deliberately de-prioritises traditional data feeds, and stale frameworks

“My values have always been led by, first, just to do something that everybody else isn’t doing. If you run with the pack you will probably lose. You might win, but more likely you will lose. So try to come up with a different way of doing things or a different set of problems to attack.

And don’t give in easily, stick with things, even when it really hurts. To do good things, can take time.”

Jim Simons, founder, Renaissance Technologies

De-prioritisation of traditional data feeds

Fund operation is independent of day-to-day market feeds: no broker research, no Bloomberg, no CNBC, no FT.com

Focus is on the continual evolution of our proprietary systems: our search for opportunities is instead a function of our own proprietary systems build, including extensive and thoughtful data selection captured into Excel and Python-coded systems

Our form of opportunity identification as such is to **target situations which exhibit a relative absence of competition from other fund managers**; by contrast as soon as an opportunity is subject to wide market commentary the probability of its co-incidence with inefficient pricing is significantly lowered

Augmentation of stale frameworks

As the world evolves, the optimal investment framework must also adapt: “*You have to keep learning if you want to become a great investor. When the world changes, you must change.*” Warren Buffett, Berkshire Hathaway letter, 2022

Conventional investment frameworks focus on moats, intrinsic value, and other standard metrics, but **decisive alpha emerges only when the investor is right while the market is also precisely wrong** – so a winning strategy must also achieve a level of differentiation from consensus.

We retain classical filters but also **apply proprietary first-principles tests derived from organisational science and evolutionary biology**. These evaluate leadership calibre, workforce merit and coordination efficiency, division of labour, scale economies, network effects, technological advantage, tailwinds from free-riding, and the presence of value catalysts.

Fund positioning

| Type | Long book holding | Value \$m | % of NAV | Short arbitrage pair (where appropriate to capture arbitrage) | Value (\$m) of holding | Gross spread (%) | Days to completion | | |
|------|--------------------------------------|-----------|----------|--|---------------------------|---------------------|-----------------------|---|--------------------|
| | | | | | | | | Gross exposure - total fund (% of NAV) | 165.3% |
| ESS | Bloomsbury Publishing Plc | 3.08 | 9.6% | | | | | Merger arbitrage long gross exposure | 69.7% |
| ESS | Fevertree Drinks PLC | 3.03 | 9.5% | | | | | Merger arbitrage short gross exposure | 5.8% |
| ESS | QXO, Inc. | 2.64 | 8.3% | | | | | Equity special situations, long gross exposure | 89.9% |
| ESS | Raspberry Pi Holdings plc | 2.55 | 8.0% | | | | | | |
| MA | Lumina Gold Corp. | 1.57 | 4.9% | | | 1.97% | 82 | Net exposure - total fund (% of NAV) | 77.4% |
| ESS | Lindt & Sprüngli AG | 1.55 | 4.8% | | | | | Merger arbitrage (beta est) | 12.5% |
| ESS | Spotify Technology S.A. | 1.52 | 4.7% | | | | | Other equities, non-binding | 89.9% |
| ESS | Formula One Group | 1.48 | 4.6% | | | | | Put option protection (delta) | -24.9% |
| MA | Aquis Exchange PLC | 1.48 | 4.6% | | | 0.62% | 21 | Net exposure | 77.4% |
| MA | Assura Plc | 1.46 | 4.6% | Primary Health Properties Plc | 0.000 | 3.75% | 113 | | |
| ESS | Amazon.com, Inc. | 1.45 | 4.5% | | | | | | |
| MA | Innervex Renewable Energy Inc. | 1.44 | 4.5% | | | 0.25% | 113 | | |
| MA | CI Financial Corp. | 1.44 | 4.5% | | | 1.47% | 6 | | |
| MA | Vigil Neuroscience, Inc. | 1.42 | 4.4% | | | 1.50% | 67 | Merger arbitrage stats (% of NAV) | |
| ESS | On Holding AG | 1.41 | 4.4% | | | | | Completion date: < 1 month | 29.0% |
| ESS | Mips AB (publ) | 1.41 | 4.4% | | | | | Completion date: 1-3 months | 15.5% |
| ESS | Canadian Pacific Kansas City Limited | 1.40 | 4.4% | | | | | Completion date: > 3 months | 114.3% |
| ESS | The Vita Coco Company, Inc. | 1.40 | 4.4% | | | | | Avg days to completion weighted by position size | 31 |
| MA | Frontier Communications Parent, Inc. | 1.39 | 4.3% | | | 5.68% | 220 | | |
| ESS | Ferrari N.V. | 1.36 | 4.3% | | | | | Percentage of deals cash versus stock | 91.7% |
| ESS | Moody's Corporation | 1.34 | 4.2% | | | | | Average gross spread weighted by position size | 3.25% |
| ESS | Visa Inc. | 1.31 | 4.1% | | | | | | |
| MA | Galaxy Gaming | 1.27 | 4.0% | | | 12.19% | 21 | | |
| MA | Biotage AB (publ) | 1.21 | 3.8% | | | 1.72% | 14 | Other stats | |
| MA | Covestro AG | 1.17 | 3.7% | | | 3.23% | 21 | Top 5 positions as % of NAV | 40.2% |
| MA | Deliveroo plc | 1.06 | 3.3% | | | 2.56% | 159 | Top 10 positions as % of NAV | 68.1% |
| MA | Spirent Communications plc | 1.00 | 3.1% | | | 3.02% | 6 | Top 20 positions as % of NAV | 107.6% |
| MA | Ceres Global Ag Corp. | 0.96 | 3.0% | | | 2.54% | 36 | | |
| MA | New World Resources Limited | 0.73 | 2.3% | | | 4.00% | 113 | Total number of positions | 45 |
| MA | Direct Line Insurance Group plc | 0.72 | 2.2% | Aviva plc | -0.410 | 1.64% | 21 | of which merger arbitrage | 26 |
| MA | Kellanova | 0.70 | 2.2% | | | 1.96% | 21 | of which equity special situations | 18 |
| ESS | Intercontinental Exchange, Inc. | 0.64 | 2.0% | | | | | | |
| ESS | Netflix, Inc. | 0.63 | 2.0% | | | | | | |
| ESS | CME Group Inc. | 0.60 | 1.9% | | | | | Special Opportunities | 0.0% of NAV |
| MA | ALLETE, Inc. | 0.49 | 1.5% | | | 2.42% | 46 | Pershing Square SPARC Holdings, warrants | 0.00% |
| MA | FARO Technologies, Inc. | 0.49 | 1.5% | | | 3.43% | 113 | <i>(SSF owns 387,285 SPAR warrants; each warrant contains a call on two stock units upon merger announcement)</i> | |
| MA | Envirosuite Limited | 0.48 | 1.5% | | | 7.78% | 113 | | |
| MA | The AZEK Company Inc. | 0.39 | 1.2% | James Hardie Industries plc | -0.196 | -0.55% | 113 | | |
| MA | Benchmark Holdings plc | 0.38 | 1.2% | | | 4.00% | 128 | | |
| MA | Dowlais Group plc | 0.31 | 1.0% | American Axle & Manufacturing Holdings, Inc. | -0.127 | 18.42% | 67 | | |
| MA | Servotronics, Inc. | 0.30 | 0.9% | | | 0.55% | 21 | | |
| MA | Science in Sport plc | 0.20 | 0.6% | | | 1.47% | 52 | | |
| MA | Ainsworth Game Technology Limited | 0.20 | 0.6% | | | 7.50% | 82 | | |
| MA | Angus Gold Inc. | 0.05 | 0.2% | Wesdome Gold Mines Ltd. | -0.012 | 0.94% | 6 | | |

Key: ESS = equity special situation, MA = merger arbitrage


Source: Green Ash Partners internal systems



Equity special situation case study


Fever Tree, \$1.3bn mcap, held at 9.5% of NAV

1. Fever Tree, a market leading premium beverages company, has seen its valuation de-rate to just 1.7x EV/Sales..




Source: corporate disclosures

3. The reason for the Fever Tree de-rating has been its margin decline, caused by rising transatlantic shipping costs (from UK) as the US has gone to the largest part of its revenue



Source: GA-Courtenay research, corporate disclosures

2. Despite, since 2009, revenue growth at 35% annualised, comprehensively penetrating multiple regions worldwide



Source: corporate disclosures

In January 2025, Fever Tree signed a transformational deal with Molson Coors. The deal moves all production for the US market to on-shore, removing transatlantic shipping costs and exposure to tariffs. Based on 2025 consensus revenue estimates, a return to historic 35% operating margins would yield a P/E ratio of 7.9x – or just 7.1x excluding cash at year end 2024. The Molson Coors deal also stands to significantly accelerate Fever Tree's revenue growth.

Source: GA-Courtenay research




Equity special situation case study

QXO, \$11bn mcap, held at 8.3% of NAV



1. a) An investor who backed the prior vehicles of Brad Jacobs, United Waste Systems, United Rentals, and then XPO Logistics, would have realised a 20% annualised return



Source: GA-Courtenay research, corporate disclosures

1. b) June 2024, Brad Jacobs announces QXO, a publically listed cash shell entity targeting a series of M&A transactions in the building products distribution industry



"QXO plans to become a tech-forward leader in the \$800bn building products distribution industry. The company is targeting tens of billions of dollars of annual revenue in the next decade through accretive acquisitions and organic growth."

QXO press release June 13th 2024²⁵


2. Our entry cost in QXO was an \$11bn equity capitalisation, following the company raising \$7.7bn of capital from investors including Orbis, Walton family office, Kushner

| Date | Issuance security | Status | Capital raised (\$m) | Stock: subscription price per share Warrants: strike price per share | Shares issued (m) | Subscribers |
|---|------------------------------|-------------|-------------------------------|--|-------------------|---|
| | Common stock preceding | | | | | 0.7 |
| Dec 04, 2023 | Deal agreement consideration | Completed | 1,000 | | | 90% Brad Jacobs, 10% Sequoia Heritage |
| Jun 13, 2024 | Common stock | Completed | 3,116 | | 9.14 | 340.9 Orbis, MFN, Finepoint, Madrone |
| Jul 22, 2024 | Common stock | Completed | 620 | | 9.14 | 68 Institutions including Affinity Partners |
| Jul 22, 2024 | Pre-funded warrants | Completed | 384 | | 9.14 | 42 Other investors (non disclosed) |
| | | | 5,120 | | 9.14 | 451.4 |
| Dec 04, 2023 | Convertible preferred stock | If executed | 1,000 | | 4.57 | 219 90% Brad Jacobs, 10% Sequoia Heritage |
| Dec 04, 2023 | Warrants | If executed | 500 | | 4.57 | 109 90% Brad Jacobs, 10% Sequoia Heritage |
| Dec 04, 2023 | Warrants | If executed | 375 | | 6.85 | 55 90% Brad Jacobs, 10% Sequoia Heritage |
| Dec 04, 2023 | Warrants | If executed | 749 | | 13.70 | 55 90% Brad Jacobs, 10% Sequoia Heritage |
| | | | 2,624 | | 5.99 | 438.3 |
| | | | 7,744 | | 8.71 | 889.4 |
| Date | Market cap (\$m) | Share price | Total diluted share count (m) | | | |
| Feb 25, 2025 | 10,682 | | 12.01 | | 889.4 | |
| Therefore, premium to net cash position | | 38% | | | | |

Source: corporate disclosures

Our approach undertakes a deep dive analysis of the business strategy of QXO, including leadership team and operational competency, industry choice, through to M&A targets, and sensitivity analysis in relation to prospective outcomes

Source: GA-Courtenay research





Equity special situation case study


Raspberry Pi, \$1.1bn mcap, 8.0% of NAV




1. Raspberry Pi dominates small form factor computing, with a community followership that competes in size even with scaled US tech companies



2. Raspberry Pi possesses an advantaged product set, enabling the company to grow revenues at 50% per annum over the last decade and significantly ahead of closest alternatives



3. Addressable market size is 70x current revenues



Our deep dive research concludes Raspberry Pi maintaining a significant advantage over its nearest peers, particularly in price-performance and cohesive aspects of its compute platform provided for by Raspberry Pi's vertically integrated business design.

Source: GA-Courtenay white papers from website


Equity special situation case study

Raspberry Pi, \$1.1bn mcap, 8.0% of NAV



1. Multiple signalling as to revenue growth prospects above consensus estimates

Raspberry Pi is building inventories, a behaviour normally co-incident with anticipated revenue growth



The workforce of Raspberry Pi increased by 41% in 2024, relative to a 1% increase in 2023 and 11% in 2022



Raspberry Pi in 2024 also increased its reseller relationships by 20%




ARM Holdings (CPU design licensor, insider) more than doubled its stake at the 2024 IPO of the company


| | Following the Pre-IPO Reorganisation and Immediately prior to Admission ⁽¹⁾ | | Immediately following Admission | |
|---|---|---|------------------------------------|---|
| | Number of Shares | Percentage of total share capital | Number of Shares | Percentage of total share capital |
| Shareholders | | | | |
| Raspberry Pi Foundation ⁽²⁾⁽³⁾ | 140,854,692 | 77.31 | 94,919,627 | 49.08 |
| Landstone Developed Markets Master Fund Limited ⁽⁴⁾ | 5,036,894 | 4.41 | 13,136,894 | 6.79 |
| Evotek Creditable Trust | 6,430,098 | 3.53 | 6,430,098 | 3.32 |
| Isap Semiconductor Solutions Corporation | 3,213,592 | 1.76 | 3,213,592 | 1.66 |
| Asia Technology Investments 2 Limited ⁽⁵⁾ | 6,427,148 | 3.53 | 16,252,188 | 8.40 |
| Employees Benefit Trust ⁽⁶⁾ | 5,870,880 | 3.42 | 7,745,760 | 4.00 |

2. Scale of customer set significantly larger than Raspberry Pi's trailing revenues

Raspberry Pi spotted at London Stansted Airport




They use a raspberry pi at McDonald's



Raspberry Pi products are deployed across diverse applications including electric vehicle charging, elevators and escalators, industrial control and automation, sports performance tracking, digital signage, smart buildings, and energy management.

Figure sources: GA-Courtenay white papers from website

The fund's positive carry hedge structure works by combining merger arbitrage yield with index put option protection



Advantages of GA-Courtenay approach relative to other absolute return strategies

Relative to **balanced** funds:
the potential for leverage, avoidance of credit risk in macro shock scenarios


Relative to **long/short** funds:
the removal of unlimited liability property of short selling, removal of speculation, lowering of cyclical aspects

Relative to **macro** funds:
greater determinism in outcomes, higher consistency, removal of speculation

Relative to **pure merger arbitrage** funds:
greater potential for decisive performance advantage, ability to overcome “seasonal aspects” of merger arbitrage

Source: GA-Courtenay research illustration

Defensive characteristics of hedge structure evidenced: Q1 2025




Source: S&P500 pricing data, GA-Courtenay daily NAVs

Modest fund size optimises merger arbitrage capture potential



Two thirds of global merger arbitrage opportunities are capitalised below \$1bn

All global merger arbitrage opportunities, ranked by market capitalisation, October 2024



Source: Green Ash Partners internal systems


Search systems target comprehensive new merger arbitrage identification



Source: Green Ash Partners internal systems

Multiple pillars drive performance enhancement in merger arbitrage

- Comprehensive search
- Antitrust history systems
- Spread behaviour history systems
- Shareholder activism
- Competitive bidding situations
- Contingent value rights



Source: GA-Courtenay white papers available on our website

Arbitrage case study: Loungers Plc, \$0.4bn mcap, held at 9.5% of NAV

Loungers was subject to a takeover offer by Fortress in November 2024. This fund built a position in Loungers in December 2024, and engaged with the company regarding our dissatisfaction with the offer price. The offer price was subsequently raised in January 2025.

January 25th 2025: takeover offer for Loungers is increased to 325p



Source: GA-Courtenay research, Google Finance, internal systems

The fund acquired 9.5% of NAV in Loungers Plc at a price of 304.5p on 2nd of December 2024, and sold the entire position at 321p on 15th January 2025.

As such, the fund realised an annualised return of 55%.

Following the takeover proposal, multiple shareholders, including this fund, communicated to the company dissatisfaction with the offer price

This is MONEY
FINANCIAL WEBSITE OF THE YEAR

Loungers shareholder 'furious' at £338m deal

By LAURA AVETISYAN

UPDATED: 11:20, 30 November 2024

More shareholders have come out to oppose the takeover of a cafe-bar chain by US private equity.

Fund manager Downing, which has a 1.5 per cent stake in Loungers, said it was 'absolutely furious' about the proposed deal. And Gresham House said it would use its near-4 per cent stake to 'vote against this transaction'.

The comments came after Slater Investments, which owns more than 10 per cent of Loungers, and Axa Investment Management, with over 4 per cent, said they were opposed to the takeover.

But Canaccord Genuity Asset Management, which holds a 1.7 per cent stake in Loungers, became the latest shareholder to back the deal.


That takes confirmed support for the takeover to 41.9 per cent. Loungers, which owns the Cosy Club and Brightside brands and has 280 sites, this week agreed to a £338million takeover by Majestic Wine owner Fortress Investment Group.

But Judith Mackenzie, a partner at Downing, said: 'We are furious about this.' She said the attempt to buy Loungers was 'opportunistic'.

Source: This is Money

Arbitrage case study: Concentric AB, US\$770m mcap, held at 8% of NAV

In late September, and early October, the fund allocated to Concentric AB at 8% of NAV, capturing a more than 150% IRR by October 23rd



| Date | DTC | # | px | Outflow (SEK) | Inflow (SEK) | Gross spread | Return | Annualised return |
|------------|-----|---------|--------|---------------|--------------|--------------|--------|-------------------|
| 19/09/2024 | 34 | 17,000 | 222.50 | -3,782,500 | | 3.3% | 3.4% | 42.8% |
| 23/09/2024 | 30 | 34,000 | 221.00 | -7,514,000 | | 3.9% | 4.1% | 62.6% |
| 26/09/2024 | 27 | 17,000 | 221.00 | -3,757,000 | | 3.9% | 4.1% | 71.6% |
| 11/10/2024 | 12 | 35,700 | 214.75 | -7,666,575 | | 6.6% | 7.1% | 707.0% |
| 11/10/2024 | 12 | 35,700 | 214.87 | -7,670,893 | | 6.6% | 7.0% | 693.3% |
| 23/10/2024 | | 139,400 | 230.00 | | 32,062,000 | | | |

IRR on full deployment
152%

Source: GA-Courtenay research, internal systems, Yahoo Finance

The Q3 earnings report of Concentric was interpreted as a profit warning, however, the report was not materially different from Concentric's Q2 earnings report (disclosed before takeover offer)

Concern over Material Adverse Change clause within Concentric takeover agreement

Di: Signs of bidding turmoil after Concentric's profit warning, short selling increases

October 04, 2024 at 01:23 pm

Short selling is increasing in bid-active Concentric and the share is trading below the bid price after a profit warning. Parts of the market seem to be speculating that the bid from A.P. Møller Holding will be withdrawn. This would be a historic event in a Swedish context, and unlikely according to an expert on public takeover bids. This is according to Dagens Industri.

The terms of AP Møller's bid include a disclaimer, which in industry terms is called Material Adverse Change, MAC, which means that the bid can be withdrawn under certain circumstances.

Source: Marketscreener, Olivetree EventDriven

Concern over 90% acceptance condition within Concentric takeover agreement

Olivetree Event Driven Morning Analysis 16th of October 2024

Olivetree EventDriven <eventdriven@ol>
To
Wed 7:31

• COIC SS (RISK ARB): Offer period expiration today at 3pm CET, with tender update expected latest by Friday. As of yesterday, advisors seemed to be actively calling and reminding shareholders to tender, whereas bidder remains very tight-lipped how it would proceed if it would not reach the 90% acceptance condition.

Bidder A. P. Møller Holding is a long-term, strategic investor

A.P. Møller Holding is an investment company and the parent company of the A.P. Møller Group – a group of companies spanning various sectors and industries. A.P. Møller Holding is committed to its long standing purpose of investing in and developing businesses that have a positive impact on society.




Robert Mærsk Uggla, CEO at A.P. Møller Holding, speaking at Tomorrow Summit 2021

Source: A. P. Møller Holding

Arbitrage case study: I3 Energy Plc, \$190m mcap, held at 9% of NAV

In August this year, Gran Tierra Energy announced a takeover for UK-listed I3 Energy Plc. The primary deal is structured 80% in cash and 20% in shares, although shareholders can also elect for their pro-rata share of a deal 100% in cash (or 100% in stock)



Source: GA-Courtenay research, internal systems

The NPV of I3 Energy at \$725m is 3.8x the takeover deal value of \$190m; however, the takeover has secured 32% hard binding irrevocables

7 Information relating to I3 Energy

As of 31 July 2024, I3 Energy had 2P reserves of approximately 175 MMBOE, and an

independently assessed 2P NPV10 (after tax) of US\$725 million

8. Irrevocable undertakings and letters of intent

| Name of beneficial holder | Number of I3 Energy shares in respect of which undertaking is given | Percentage of total issued share capital of I3 Energy in respect of which undertaking is given % |
|---------------------------|---|--|
| Total | 388,683,329 | 32.32% |

Total Irrevocable Undertakings

8.2 The irrevocable undertakings given by the I3 Energy Directors will only cease to be binding if:

- Gran Tierra announces, with the consent of the Panel, that it does not intend to proceed with the Acquisition and no new, revised or replacement acquisition is announced in accordance with Rule 2.7 of the Code at the same time;
- the Offer or Scheme lapses or is withdrawn and no new, revised or replacement acquisition is announced in accordance with Rule 2.7 of the Code at the same time.

Source: I3 Energy Plc, takeover by Gran Tierra Energy, Scheme Document

If we are filled on the default deal consideration (cash + stock), the IRR of our deployment will have been 29.5%

| Date | DTC # | px | Outflow (GBP) | Inflow (GBP) | Gross spread | Return | Annualised return |
|------------|-------|------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|--------|-------------------|
| 08/20/2024 | 87 | 1,312,729 | 12.30 | -161,466 | 5.6% | 5.9% | 27.2% |
| 08/21/2024 | 86 | 987,271 | 12.30 | -121,434 | 5.6% | 5.9% | 27.6% |
| 08/21/2024 | 86 | 8,000,000 | 12.32 | -985,405 | 5.4% | 5.8% | 26.8% |
| 08/27/2024 | 80 | 1,991,571 | 12.47 | -248,445 | 4.2% | 4.4% | 21.8% |
| 08/27/2024 | 80 | 45,000 | 12.40 | -5,580 | 4.8% | 5.1% | 25.2% |
| 08/28/2024 | 79 | 1,396,274 | 12.47 | -174,128 | 4.3% | 4.5% | 22.3% |
| 08/29/2024 | 78 | 358,590 | 12.47 | -44,699 | 4.3% | 4.5% | 22.9% |
| 08/30/2024 | 77 | 753,565 | 12.45 | -93,833 | 4.4% | 4.6% | 23.9% |
| 09/04/2024 | 72 | 2,130,138 | 11.93 | -254,165 | 8.4% | 9.2% | 56.1% |
| 09/05/2024 | 71 | 2,207,875 | 12.29 | -271,368 | 5.6% | 6.0% | 34.8% |
| 09/06/2024 | 70 | 92,125 | 12.16 | -11,206 | 6.6% | 7.1% | 42.9% |
| 09/09/2024 | 67 | 149,941 | 12.00 | -17,993 | 7.9% | 8.6% | 56.4% |
| 09/10/2024 | 66 | 119,921 | 12.00 | -14,391 | 7.9% | 8.6% | 57.5% |
| 11/15/2024 | | 19,545,000 | 13.03 | 2,545,995 | | | |

IRR on full deployment
29.5%

To the extent we are filled on the cash deal consideration, the IRR of our deployment will rise to 74.7%

| Date | DTC # | px | Outflow (GBP) | Inflow (GBP) | Gross spread | Return | Annualised return |
|------------|-------|------------|---------------|--------------|--------------|--------|-------------------|
| 08/20/2024 | 87 | 1,312,729 | 12.30 | -161,466 | 11.6% | 13.2% | 68.1% |
| 08/21/2024 | 86 | 987,271 | 12.30 | -121,434 | 11.6% | 13.2% | 69.1% |
| 08/21/2024 | 86 | 8,000,000 | 12.32 | -985,405 | 11.5% | 13.0% | 68.1% |
| 08/27/2024 | 80 | 1,991,571 | 12.47 | -248,445 | 10.4% | 11.6% | 64.9% |
| 08/27/2024 | 80 | 45,000 | 12.40 | -5,580 | 10.9% | 12.3% | 69.5% |
| 08/28/2024 | 79 | 1,396,274 | 12.47 | -174,128 | 10.4% | 11.6% | 66.2% |
| 08/29/2024 | 78 | 358,590 | 12.47 | -44,699 | 10.5% | 11.7% | 67.7% |
| 08/30/2024 | 77 | 753,565 | 12.45 | -93,833 | 10.5% | 11.8% | 69.7% |
| 09/04/2024 | 72 | 2,130,138 | 11.93 | -254,165 | 14.3% | 16.7% | 118.5% |
| 09/05/2024 | 71 | 2,207,875 | 12.29 | -271,368 | 11.7% | 13.3% | 89.7% |
| 09/06/2024 | 70 | 92,125 | 12.16 | -11,206 | 12.6% | 14.4% | 102.1% |
| 09/09/2024 | 67 | 149,941 | 12.00 | -17,993 | 13.8% | 16.0% | 124.6% |
| 09/10/2024 | 66 | 119,921 | 12.00 | -14,391 | 13.8% | 16.0% | 127.4% |
| 11/15/2024 | | 19,545,000 | 13.92 | 2,720,664 | | | |

IRR on full deployment
74.7%

Source: GA-Courtenay research, internal systems

As the regulatory environment adjusts under a Trump administration, M&A volumes would need to rise by 20% to return to long-term averages



“The M&A market is doing ok, but to your point about coming back, M&A volumes are running 20% below 10 year averages, there is no question that the regulatory environment has had an impact on that, and I do not think the regulatory environment is as constructive and balanced as it should be to ensure our competitive position in the world. And so I hope that adjusts, and I think that will adjust, naturally.

I think the second factor that has impacted the M&A market is that the financial sponsor community, the private equity community, has been a little bit turned off over the last few years. And we got a big reset coming out of the pandemic, and I think the private equity community is still wrestling with the value they perceive their assets to be versus the current market value, and the incentive system really leads that community to wait. So M&A around the sponsor community has been slower.


I think both those things will normalise over time, but both of those things have been headwinds to M&A in the short term here.”

David Solomon, CEO, Goldman Sachs, speaking in September 2024 [[link](#)]

The potential value of our Pershing Square Warrants, marked at zero, may be heightened in uncertain market environments

Our base case assessment has been for a \$15.5m potential value uplift assuming a transaction announcement by Pershing Square SPARC

- The fund owns 387,285 Pershing Square SPAR warrants, and each warrant has a right to two stock units. Therefore, the fund owns rights to 774,570 stock units.
- If a merger partner seeks to raise \$12-13bn, the strike of the SPAR stock units is \$100.
- The average day one price rise for private-to-public transactions (IPOs) is +20%, and this has been consistently positive every year for the last 40 years (see RHS chart).
- The base case calculation contention: $774,570 \times \$100 \times 20\% = \15.5m .



Bill Ackman comments at the Pershing Square Holdings 2024 AGM (February 2025)

"So why hasn't Pershing Square SPARC announced a transaction yet? And the answer is, it really relates to, why have there not been more IPOs? In this ebullient economic environment, rates are reasonably low, everyone is interested in investing in IPOs, and yet there are not a lot of IPOs.



The reason for that in my opinion, and the reason we have not done a SPARC transaction, is that the private market carrying values of both private equity companies and venture-backed companies in many cases are above where they would trade in public markets.

And so the private equity sponsors, and the management teams, and the shareholders, do not want to get a public mark. And so they are waiting for the business values to grow enough, and so that by the time the companies are ready to go public, they can actually trade them.

And we are looking to buy a very high quality business, but we have to buy it at a price that makes sense for us as a major shareholder of the company, where the SPARC investors get a nice uplift at the time the company goes public. But we are actively talking to people, and looking at SPARC transactions."

Source: GA-Courtenay white papers from website, GA-Courtenay research calculations, Bill Ackman public comments at Pershing Square Holdings AGM February 2025

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